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Abstract 
International trade is a major channel for technology diffusion. However 
regressing trade in R&D intensive goods to evaluate the effect of technology 
imports on productivity in a cross section of countries may be misleading 
because of simultaneity bias. I identify the effect of technology trade on 
productivity using geographical instruments for the trade variable as in 
Frankel and Romer (1999). I make several contributions. First, I provide 
evidence that OLS estimates are downward biased. Second, the effect is 
robust to the exclusion of outliers, the inclusion of latitude, and to different 
subsamples. Finally, I document the channels throughout technology imports 
affect productivity. 
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Recently, endogenous growth models have shed a good deal of light on the dynamic 
gains of international trade
1. Exchange between two countries enhances the diffusion of 
technological and organizational knowledge from the more advanced economies to the 
rest of the world, and hence, stimulate productivity.  
There are several channels through which knowledge spillovers potentially take 
place. First, international trade allows countries to gain access to a broader variety of 
intermediates and capital goods. Second, contact through borders establish 
communication channels needed for learning new production processes, new designs, or 
new management techniques. Third, trade facilitates copying and adaptation foreign 
technologies to domestic uses. And forth, openness to trade improves the productivity in 
imitating and developing new technologies from abroad. Several technological 
spillovers take place throughout FDI and personal contacts. However, an evaluation of 
each of these channels is a difficult task and still more difficult to link technology 
diffusion to trade openness. Keller (2001) is an attempt to disentangle alternative ways 
such as foreign direct investment or trade as channels of technology diffusion in seven 
industrialized economies. Not surprisingly he find that trade is the most important 
channel of diffusion.  
This paper is an exploration about the links of the causal relationship between 
trade and growth. I focus on the trade of R&D intensive goods as a way of technology 
flows through borders. In fact, innovation processes are concentrated in a handful of 
countries and these economies are the major capital good producers and exporters, as 
documented by Eaton and Kortum (2001). This suggests that developing economies 
import from R&D intensive economies technology that is embodied in those goods. A 
measure of disaggregated capital stock by R&D intensity unfortunately is not available, 
but imports of certain goods are a reasonable proxy for embodied technology 
investments in a developing country. 
R&D investment is a key input in the production of new technologies. A group 
of twenty one OECD economies concentrate more than 90 per cent world R&D 
expenditures. Manufacturing sector is the main recipient of those investments. Several 
industries are more R&D intensives than others, then, I restrict the technological sector 
                                                 
1 See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a, 1991b), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).   3
to those manufacturing sectors relatively R&D intensive in OECD economies
2. To 
account for technology trade I used a taxonomy based on Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) revision 1 at 4-digit level and similar to that used in ECLAC 
(2002) from COMTRADE. I extract times series of technology exports from OECD 
economies to the rest of the world by country since 1965 at annual basis. Technology is 
the sum of the following R&D intensive sectors: medicines and several chemical 
products (SITC 541+553), machinery and power engines excluding internal combustion 
engines (SITC 7111-7118), specialized machinery excluding paper and food machinery 
processing (SITC 722+7231+7249+726+729+734), instruments and various 
manufactures (SITC 861+862+864) and others (SITC 9510). 
Differences in technology specialization among OECD economies are 
enormous. Table 1 show the share of technology exports in each country between 1965 
and 1995. For the OECD as a whole, technology exports represented 1 per cent of GDP 
in 1965, whereas in 1995 it represents 3 per cent. All the countries have experienced an 
increase in its relative specialization along the period considered. Ireland is the most 
dynamic case; however Belgium (including Luxembourg) has experienced a dramatic 
increase as well. There are several countries that export above the average along the 
period, such as Switzerland, Germany or Netherlands. In a lower position there are 
Denmark, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden. On the other hand, 
there is a group of countries exporting a lower fraction of its GDP in technology. This 
group is formed by Australia, Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Portugal and USA. Astonishingly, Japan and USA are high-income countries 
investing a large amount in R&D activities but having a low rate of technology exports. 
However, using the revealed comparative advantage index (RCA) results are quite 
different. In Figures 1 and 2 I see the low correlation between the RCA index and GDP 
per worker in OECD economies and the high correlation between the RCA index and 
the R&D expenditure. This means that R&D is a better predictor of technology 
specialization than income. 
I depart from this fact to evaluate the effects of trade in “technology” on 
productivity and long term growth. This paper is a contribution to the literature of 
growth empirics in the way to deal with the problem of endogeneity in the productivity 
                                                 
2 A complete characterization of R&D distribution among countries and sectors is in OECD (2001).   4
regression. Trying to estimate the effect of technology imports on productivity by OLS 
regressions may not reflect the effect of technology on productivity. The simultaneity 
bias arises because the correlation of technology imports and productivity could mean 
that countries with higher productivity import more technology rather the other way 
around. Frankel and Romer (1999) developed a method for calculate an instrumental 
variable to solve the endogeneity problem using geographic information about bilateral 
trade. However, Frankel and Romer’s method cannot isolate the channel through trade 
(by exports or by imports) affect economic performance. In this paper I propose a 
specific treatment for imports endogeneity using geographic information about bilateral 
technology flows to get an instrument for overall technology imports. 
This paper is also related to previous works about the role of capital goods 
imports on economic growth. Lee (1995) presents a model in which the use of more 
imported inputs increase the efficiency of capital accumulation spurring long term 
growth. He estimate using an instrumental variable (IV) for capital goods imports in a 
growth regression equation finding a significant positive relationship. However, the 
instrument he uses is a mix of geography (distance to trade partners and area) and 
policy variables (tariff rates). Whereas the former are exogenous the latter may not
3. I 
differ from Lee (1995) in two aspects, first I don’t use simply capital goods but a more 
complex definition, i.e. R&D intensive products, and second, I employ only geographic 
information on imports to instrument in the growth regression. 
The paper is also clearly related to the empirical technology diffusion literature
4. 
Whereas most of these papers estimate a productivity equation in (5 years) differences 
their findings about the relationship of imports on growth are far from being long term 
relationships. In addition there are not specific treatments for endogeneity. Using a 
different methodology Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that geographic barriers to trade 
in capital goods explain a high percentage of international differences in productivity. 
Also Caselli and Wilson (2003) exploit the investment composition effect (measured by 
imports of different capital goods) for explaining the cross-country variation in per 
capita income. 
                                                 
3 Rodrick (1995) argue that trade policy is used in low productivity countries because is an easy way to 
collect taxes. 
4 E.g. Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), Keller (1998), Crespo, Martín 
and Velázquez (2002).   5
I start the next section of the paper describing the estimation strategy. In Section 
2 I calculate the instrument variable and evaluate the quality of the instrument. In 
Section 3 I present the estimation results. And finally in Section 4 I summarize and 
evaluate the results. 
1 Empirical strategy 
New trade theories have found theoretical arguments for using gravity models in 
empirical studies. The simple idea is that bilateral trade from country i and country j is a 
function of their physical distance and respective sizes. Economies of scale and 
complementarities play the key role in the theoretical foundations of this model. Hence, 
trade between two economies separated by a land border is more likely than trade 
between two economies separated by an ocean or too many kilometers of distance 
ceteris paribus. Additionally, a small economy tends to trade more vis a vis with a large 
country than two large countries between them. 




β β β β τ j i ij ij S S D =  
Where  ij τ is the sum of exports and imports between i and j to i’s GDP,  ij D  is distance, 
i S and  j S are i and j’s sizes respectively. 
  Equation (1) can be estimated including as much indicators of size and distance 
as available. The strategy I follow in estimation consist in obtain an instrumental 
variable from the gravity equation (1) been  ijt m  the technology imports flowing in 
country  i from country j in time t the dependent variable. All the right hand side 
variables are geographic variables, and hence exogenous in a growth regression. Once 
estimated equation (1) I aggregate to get all the technology imports originated in R&D 
performing countries ( ∑ =
j
ijt it m M ) country by country. The result is quite clear; I get 
the technology imports in a cross section of economies explained by a pure model of 
geography. This method discards the possibility of endogeneity and assures efficiency 
and consistency in a productivity equation. 
Productivity is a result of interactions taking place inside and outside of a 
country. Traditional growth theory has introduced several ways of analyzing the growth 
determinants in a closed economy. New growth theorists have shed new lights on the   6
external linkages emphasizing the international flow of knowledge through trade. 
Openness to trade may alter the specialization pattern in a world in which some 
countries have comparative advantage to produce ideas. Moreover, international 
knowledge spillovers increase productivity, i.e. importing machinery, and probably 
accelerate long term growth in the presence of scale effects, as suggested by Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and Lee (1995).  
  In the simple framework I propose GDP per worker in country i ( i y ) is a linear 
function of the share of imports of R&D intensive goods to GDP ( i M ) that reflect the 
positive effect of investing a country’s trade partner’s new technologies and a set of 
exogenous variables ( i I ) that capture the effect of other sources of technology 
adoption. In order to provide consistency to the geography approach I consider as ( i I ) 
variables the log of population and the log of area as exogenous variables. Moreover, 
new growth theory suggests the possibility of scale effects operating through the 
production of new technologies. The error term reflects the rest of influences. 
(2)  i i i i e M I y + + + = 2 1 0   log α α α  
The main feature of the equation is that all the independent variables but imports 
are of geographic nature. The key insight of this approach is that a country’s geographic 
attributes may act as instruments of technology imports. Since distance and size are 
highly correlated with trade, although are independent of productivity, can be used to 
identify the effect of technology imports on productivity. There are of course other 
relevant factors determining productivity, all of them are relegated to the error term 
since they are likely independent of the instrument. I will look further into that 
possibility. 
2. The instrumental variable 
2.1 DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table 2 reflects technology imports share from 1965 to 1995. This is a long period for 
trade statistics and UN statistical information reveal some gaps for several countries. 
This is not a serious problem since I am interested in long term relationships; hence I 
take averages for the period in countries with no less than 10 annual observations and 
discard the rest of countries. The resulting sample includes 21 OECD economies and 69   7
developing countries non oil exporters. Economies are grouped according to geographic 
information exclusively. Data show East Asia and Pacific and Latin American 
economies the more technology importer regions. Conversely, the less technology 
importer regions are North America and South Asia. It is clear that the former is a 
producer and exporter of technology while the latter is not. 
2.2 TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS FUNCTION 
  Bilateral trade equation derived from the gravity model (1) may have several 
specifications. I hope a country technology imports are negatively related to its distance 
to the technological leaders and positively to its respective size. I depart from a simple 
linear specification including various measures of size and proximity. The estimated 
equation is: 
(3) 
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Where, in addition to the known variables, L is a dummy taking the value 1 
when the country i or j have access to an ocean and take the value 0 otherwise; Long is 
the country longitude in absolute value, Lati is the latitude in absolute value, both 
reflect climate influences, Cont a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the importer 
and the exporter share a common border and take the value 0 otherwise. All the 
variables are of geography and I am going to test whether this simple model can explain 
technology imports originated in OECD economies. I include interactions between Cont 
and distance, area, population and L trying to measure the higher weight of trade among 
countries sharing a border.  
Trade data comes from COMTRADE database. Importer countries are those that 
reported data to United Nations and R&D performer countries are those reflected in 
Table 2. Technology imports are divided by current GDP in US dollars, as provided by 
World Bank (2001). Distance is measured by great circle between two capital cities and 
jointly to contiguity has been provided by Haveman (2000). Data on area and 
population are from World Bank (2001) and landlocked dummy, latitude and longitude 
are from Easterly and Sewadeh (2001).   8
Equation (6) is estimated using a large amount of observations by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with standard errors that are robust to clustering, since country pairs are 
likely to be dependent across years. Additionally I use time dummies given the 
possibility of aggregate shocks, i.e. transport cost reductions.  
Table 3 show estimation results of equation (3). The model explains 54 per cent 
of variations in bilateral technology imports from R&D performing countries to the rest 
of the world. The first column shows the coefficients and the second the interaction 
terms of each variable to contiguity. Because of space restrictions I have omitted time 
dummies. 
Results speak by themselves. The entire hypothesis appears to be confirmed and 
almost all the coefficients are significant at 1 per cent. Distance is the most influential 
variable with a coefficient close to 1. Area of the importer country is negatively related 
to technology imports, this fact confirm the presumption that small countries tend to 
trade more with the rest of the world. The same can be said about the area of the 
exporter economy, the larger the area of the technology exporter the less are the 
technology imports. Populated economies in absolute terms tend to acquire less 
technology to worldwide exporters, yet the elasticity is very low and not significant. 
The same can be said about technology exporter’s population, economies tend to import 
more technology from populated countries. Landlocked economies tend to import 41 
per cent less technology; moreover technology imports increases if the exporter 
economy is landlocked. This means that natural barriers such as access to an ocean are 
not an obstacle for exporting in R&D performing countries as in developing economies. 
Variables measuring climate influences exert a different effect. Distance to Greenwich 
is negative for the importer and positive for the exporter. Latitude may reflect climate 
influences but also western influence, the larger the distance to Equator in the importer 
economy the less is the technology import share. This fact will motivate further 
exploration in the productivity and in the growth regressions.  
The column measuring interactions to contiguity reflects that trade between 
countries sharing a common border is nine time larger than trade with the rest of 
countries. The interactions of contiguity with respect importer and exporter’s area are 
positive but non significant. Population in the importer and in the exporter economies 
reduces technology imports when countries share a common border.   9
Time dummies are also interesting. All of them are significant, positive and 
increasing in time. This is consistent to the reduction of transport cost observed in the 
literature and to the fact that there is a time trend. 
Following our estimation strategy, once a bilateral technology imports model 
have been estimated, a simple aggregation allow us to obtain the value of the overall 
technology imported explained by a pure model of geography. Let define  ijt m ˆ   log  as the 
vector of predictions of the model (3): 
(4)  ijt ijt X m ' ˆ ˆ β =   log   
Where  β ˆ  is the coefficients vector estimated in the model (a0, a1, ..., a20) appearing in 
Table 3 and  ijt X  is the vector of variables considered. Hence, the sum of the technology 











Technology imports are a potential determinant of productivity and a source of 
growth in the long term when there is a sustained propensity to adopt foreign 
knowledge embodied in goods. The instrumental variable for  i M  is an average over the 
period considered for each cross sectional unit ( i M ˆ ). 
2.3 THE INSTRUMENT QUALITY 
Figure 4 plot the relationship between the two variables, the technology imports 
share observed and the fitted measure estimated by the gravity model. The correlation 
between  i M  and  i M ˆ  is 0.58 and a regression of  i M ˆ on a constant and  i M  yields a 
coefficient of 0.66 significant at 1 per cent level as shown in Table 4. Figure 4 also 
reveal two outliers, Netherlands and Belgium, which have a higher fitted share given its 
geographic attributes. When I remove those observations the coefficient of  i M  on  i M ˆ  
rises to 0.87. 
Is not an intriguing question to see how smaller countries tend to have a larger 
propensity to import shares. Thus, for examining the extent to which technology trade 
affect productivity I must control for country size. In the second column of Table 4 I 
regress those components and I see how technology import share depend negatively of 
area and population. Although population is not significant, the area is significant at 1   10
per cent, confirming the presumption that larger countries tend to import less 
technology. The third column I add the fitted technology import share and the model 
gain in explanatory power. Moreover, size measures are negative and both are 
significant. The coefficient for the instrumental variable is lower but keeps a high 
significant level. This mean that is preserve enough information on observed technology 
import share to yields only moderated standard errors by instrumental variable 
estimation. The corresponding F-statistic on excluded instrument is 20.86 and is large 
enough to discard a likely finite sample bias of 2SLS estimate towards OLS. 
Figure 5 plot the partial association between the observed and the fitted 
technology import share once controlled for population and area. The relationship is 
slightly weaker but still positive and the effect of the two outliers is stronger. Figure 6 
represents the same information once excluded R&D performing economies. The 
resulting subsample seems more appropriate to identify technology imports with 
technology investment as documented by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Caselli and 
Wilson (2003), given the fact that only the group of R&D performing economies 
produces and exports the overall capital goods and equipment. The correlation between 
the technology imports observed and its instrument once controlled by size is even 
stronger.  
3. Technology imports, productivity and growth 
The aim of the paper is to account for the effect of technology imports on productivity 
and growth. Following our estimation strategy, the purpose of the former exercise was 
to obtain a variable correlated to the technology import variable but independent of the 
residuals of the productivity equation. Using directly the observed import share would 
bias the estimation. Hence I must use the exogenous variable instead of observed trade 
in the productivity equation and estimate by two stage least squares. 
  Productivity is a function of overall size and technology imports as specified in 
Equation (2). This decomposition of productivity may appear simple, a priori, because 
it omit others potential determinants of productivity and push them into the error term. 
As is argued by Frankel and Romer (1999), if the geographic approach to the instrument 
is correct, there is no reason for additional exogenous determinants of productivity to be 
correlated with the instrument. Moreover, the inclusion of other variables on the   11
estimation would not account for the overall effect of technology imports on 
productivity leaving out any effects operating through its impact on these variables. 
3.1 ESTIMATING THE EFFECT ON PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 5 reports the coefficients of equation (2) using population and area as measures of 
size plus a constant. The first and the second columns include the estimation results for 
90 sample countries. And the third and fourth columns include only 69 developing 
economies. All the estimations confirm the positive effect of technology imports on 
productivity. The first regression shows that controlling for size, an increase of one 
percentage point in technology import share increase GDP per worker 0.24 per cent, but 
the result is only marginally significant (t-statistic is 1.78). Size affect productivity in a 
confusing way, while area has a negative coefficient population has a positive influence, 
however neither are significant. 
  The second column show the result estimated by two stages lest squares (2SLS) 
technique using as instrument the fitted technology import share derived from the 
gravity model of trade. The coefficient imply that technology imports effect on 
productivity are six time stronger than in OLS estimation and is significant at 1 per cent 
level of confidence controlling for country size. Hence, an increase of one percentage 
point in the technology import share raises productivity by 1.45 per cent. Moving from 
OLS to 2SLS increases the effect of technology imports on productivity but also 
increase the standard error of the coefficients. Hence, I perform the Hausman (1978) 
test of exogeneity and the hypothesis of equality between OLS and 2SLS is rejected. 
Sizes measures are positive and significant at 10 per cent level of confidence. An 
overall increase in population and area of one percent increases productivity by 0.6 
percent. These facts support the view that scale effects are important not only in 
producing technologies but also in adopting foreign technologies.  
The third and fourth exclude OECD economies and represent a subsample of 
non-R&D performer countries. OLS estimates are in the third column. The magnitude 
of the effect of technology imports on productivity is similar to that obtained in the 
wider sample and is significant only at 10 per cent level of confidence. The fourth 
column show 2SLS coefficient and the technology import share is significant and five 
times larger than OLS. This implies that an increase of one percentage point in the 
technology import share raises productivity by 1.16 per cent. Once again OLS   12
estimations understate the effect on productivity. However, in this smaller subsample I 
cannot reject the hypothesis of equality between OLS and 2SLS coefficients. 
  The effect of size on productivity is confusing in OLS because population is 
positive and not significant but area is negative and significant (t-statistic = 1.94). 
Moving to 2SLS size’s effects are positive and significant in both measures at 10 per 
cent level. The overall estimate effect of increasing population and area by one percent 
is an increase of productivity by 0.3 per cent. This is again a fact that supports the view 
of scale effects on international technology adoption. 
3.2 ROBUSTNESS 
To check the robustness of the results I perform a battery of proofs. First, as it is shown 
above, I have considered a general sample of countries and a subsample of developing 
economies to examine the parameter stability. Second, it is possible that some outliers 
have a great influence on the relationship between the observed and the fitted 
technology import shares. Removing the Netherlands and Belgium the effect of 
technology imports on productivity by OLS change little, however the 2SLS coefficient 
rises to 2.25 (t = 2.92). Another possible outlier may be Singapore because it has a high 
observed import share given its size. Dropping all those countries the OLS does not 
change and the 2SLS coefficient rises to 2.04 (t = 3.36). Dropping the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Singapore is equivalent to estimate using the developing countries 
subsample, so there is no noticeable change. 
  Third, it is a serious concern that different countries located in a given 
geographic situation perform systematically better than others and these differences are 
explaining the results. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Irwin and Tervio (2000) 
suggest that previous studies evaluating the effect of trade on income such as Frankel 
and Romer (1999) are not robust to the inclusion of latitude as a explanatory variable. 
To evaluate this concern I include continental dummies and reestimate regressions in 
Table 5. Under OLS and 2SLS the coefficients are lower and the standard errors rise. In 
both samples, the constructed technology imports coefficient still is above the actual 
technology imports coefficient. And excluding the outliers the difference between OLS 
and 2SLS estimates increases. I use and alternative way to address this concern. I 
include latitude (distance to the equator) as an explanatory variable in equation (2). 
Latitude is an indicator that measures climate influences, for instance, it may proxy   13
resource endowments such as arable land, or likelihood of suffer from tropical diseases 
such as malaria. But also it measures omitted influences related to the distance to the 
equator, such as western influence. I report the estimation results in Table 6. OLS and 
2SLS coefficients are slightly smaller in the general sample, although they remain 
significant as in Table 5. Latitude appears to capture any positive and significant effect. 
In the developing economies subsample the OLS coefficient does not change and the 
2SLS coefficient rises to 1.27, keeping a highest significant level but the latitude 
coefficient is null. Thus, there is evidence of systematic differences among regions, and 
those differences appear to be captured by the variable latitude. Moreover, none of 
those differences appear to alter the relationship between technology imports and 
productivity. It is an open debate to give an economic interpretation to this evidence. In 
some sense latitude is a proxy of western influence as Hall and Jones (1999) interpret, 
but also it may be a proxy for climate adverse effects or poor infrastructure. The null 
effect of latitude in the developing countries subsample is obviously driven by the 
absence of the highest productivity countries, so latitude is capturing omitted factors 
common to the OECD economies. 
3.3 CHANNELS THROUGHOUT TECHNOLOGY TRADE AFFECT PRODUCTIVITY  
I depart from Hall and Jones (1999) development accounting exercise to detect the 
channels throughout technology imports affect productivity in the cross section of 
countries. The log of GDP per worker may be broken down into three components, the 
contributions of total factor productivity, human capital and physical capital: 
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Where /3 1 = α , K is the stock of physical capital, h is a measure of human capital per 
worker based on schooling years and A is the total factor productivity term.  
  The exercise consist in regress each component of y on the technology import 
share, both measures of size and a constant considering the trade variable exogenous 
(OLS) and endogenous (2SLS). I consider the same dataset as Hall and Jones (1999) 
used
5. Unfortunately merging both dataset there are three observations lost in the 
general sample. On a priori grounds one expect to find a strong correlation between 
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technology imports and physical capital, because importing technology is a way of 
accumulate new capital goods, as stressed by the traditional growth theory. 
Additionally, it is expected to find a high correlation between technology imports and 
the index of neutral technology, as it is emphasized by the technology diffusion 
literature.  
  Table 7 show the estimation results of the level accounting exercise. For all the 
components 2SLS are higher than OLS coefficients. It is worth noting that technology 
imports raise GDP per worker through each component. OLS estimates indicates that 
that capital deepening is affected by technology imports in a moderate way, human 
capital is also affected with a lower coefficient and finally total factor productivity is 
not clearly affected. Moving toward 2SLS estimation, the transmission channels 
become inverted and all the coefficients are significant at 1 per cent. The higher impact 
of technology trade is on total factor productivity, then on human capital and finally on 
capital depth. An increase of one percentage point in the technology import share raises 
total factor productivity, human capital and capital depth by 0.7, 0.4 and 0.35 per cent 
respectively. Furthermore, controlling for technology trade, country size plays a 
positive role in each productivity transmission channel. The overall effect of an increase 
in area and population of one percentage point is an increase on 0.3, 0.17 and 0.13 in 
total factor productivity, human capital and physical capital respectively. 
  The standard errors under the 2SLS estimation are higher than under OLS 
estimation. The hypothesis of equality between coefficients is tested and it is rejected in 
each component. So OLS tend to bias downwards the effect of technology imports on 
each component of income per worker. 
3.4 ESTIMATING THE EFFECT ON GROWTH 
The next step is to evaluate the effect of technology imports over a growth 
decomposition of GDP per worker. For this purpose I break down the GDP per worker 
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Where the first term on the right hand side is the productivity level at the beginning of 
the period and the second term is the long term growth rate of income per worker.   15
These terms are regressed against a constant, the technology import share, the log of the 
area and the log of the population. 
  Table 8 reports the results of OLS and 2SLS estimations in the general sample 
and in the developing countries subsample. In the general sample, technology imports 
have a positive effect on initial productivity level and, again, the 2SLS coefficient is 
higher. However, the growth effect over the period is positive but not significant. An 
increase of one percentage point in the technology import share increase long term 
growth by 0.02 per cent in the OLS estimation and 0.32 in the 2SLS estimation. Also, 
controlling for technology imports size has an overall positive effect on the two 
productivity terms. In the developing countries subsample, the effect on initial 
productivity level is positive and higher under the instrumental variable estimation. The 
growth effects are null under the OLS but positive and significant under 2SLS (t-
statistic = 1.71). An increase of one percentage point in the technology import share rise 
long term growth by 1 per cent in developing economies. Moreover, size exerts an 
overall positive influence on productivity growth controlling for technology imports. 
3.5 ASSESSING THE BIAS 
A serious concern is whether OLS is downward biasing the estimates. In theory, high 
productivity economies have more domestic resources and infrastructures to overcome 
the cost of distance and tend to import more. Moreover, high productivity countries 
have better institutions to reduce the informational search cost linked to international 
trade activities. And also, trade policies that encourage technology imports and raise 
productivity may be correlated to other sound policies enhancing productivity. All these 
reasons lead to positive correlation between the technology import share and the error 
term in the equation (2), and bias upwards OLS estimates of technology trade on 
productivity. However, what it is found in that 2SLS estimates are higher than OLS by 
large and in some cases the differences are statistically significant. How to explain this 
puzzle? 
  One possible explanation comes from the presence of measurement errors in 
variables. Productivity or technology trade data are likely to be recorded with 
measurement errors. In this case OLS estimation would be downward biased. Another 
source of measurement error arises because the using of proxy variables. It may be 
possible that R&D intensive goods imports averaged over a long period is an imperfect   16
measure for proxying R&D spillovers or technology flows between countries, as 
prescribe endogenous growth literature. Under this situation OLS coefficient will be 
also downward biased. Unfortunately, to distinguish empirically between one and 
another measurement error is not possible.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the correlation existing between technology imports and 
productivity cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting the idea that trade (in R&D 
intensive products) increases productivity. Importer behavior is not determined 
exogenously and ordinary regressions would produce biased estimates. To address this 
problem I have constructed an instrumental variable based on geographic components 
of technology imports. Distance between countries, climate or isolation are variables 
not affected by productivity, income level or policy and this fact reveal them to be 
appropriate candidates for deducing an instrument for technology trade. 
  Productivity is affected by inward and outward economic interactions. Prior 
studies have detected that outward interactions comes mainly from trade in R&D 
intensive products. The fact that capital goods are produced and exported in a handful 
of countries support the view that technology import share is a good proxy for 
investment in embodied technologies specially in developing economies. To the extent 
in which this trade is determined by geography I get consistent estimates of the effects 
of technology trade on productivity.  
  Results showed technology imports increase productivity in the general sample 
and in the developing economies subsample. The relation of geographic component of 
technology imports imply that an increase in 1 percentage point in the technology 
import share over the period 1965 and 1995 raises productivity by 1.45 and by 1.16 per 
cent in both samples respectively. Additionally, scale variables such as area and 
population have been found as positively related to productivity. This fact supports the 
view that controlling for trade variable, size is an important variable for productivity. 
The results are robust to the exclusion of outliers, and to the inclusion of latitude. The 
effects are estimated with great precision in the general sample; however it is not 
possible to reject the hypothesis of equality between the OLS and the 2SLS coefficients 
in the developing countries subsample.   17
The findings also suggest that technology imports increase GDP per worker 
enhancing the total factor productivity term, as suggested by the endogenous growth 
and the technology diffusion literatures. Moreover, human capital and capital depth are 
spurred by technology imports, although to a less extent. Long term growth is also 
affected by technology imports. A rise of one percentage point in technology import 
share increase growth by 1 per cent in the developing economies subsample. The size 
exert a positive effect, populated countries tend to grow faster when technology trade is 
controlled for.  
This evidence raises questions about the growth effects of trade policy in 
developing countries. While geography impose natural barriers to economies far from 
technological leaders import substitution policies have created still larger barriers for 
developing economies with long term effects. Trade promoting policies drawn to attract 
foreign technologies may overcome geography’s adverse effects that have a level effect 
on productivity, but also they have an effect on productivity growth. To understand this 
phenomenon requires further investigation about the dynamic effects of learning and 
adopting technologies from abroad.    18
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Table 1: Technology exports (in % of GDP) 
  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.0  1.1 1.0
Austria 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.6 2.0  1.8 1.7
Belgium-Luxembourg 2.3 3.9 5.5 6.7 10.3  9.0 9.6
Canada 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.2  1.2 2.0
Switzerland 3.5 4.6 4.5 5.1 5.9  6.0 6.8
Germany 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.7  3.1 2.7
Denmark 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.3  2.2 2.5
Spain 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.1  0.9 1.3
Finland 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.4  1.2 1.7
France 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.4  2.1 2.5
United Kingdom  1.1 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.5  2.2 2.9
Greece 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3  0.4 0.3
Ireland 0.4 1.2 2.4 4.8 7.7  8.9 15.7
Italy 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.2  1.0 1.6
Japan 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5
Netherlands 3.0 4.3 5.5 6.2 8.8  7.9 7.2
Norway 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8  2.0 2.0
New Zealand  0.5 0.7 0.3 0.9 1.4  1.1 1.7
Portugal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.7  1.2 1.0
Sweden 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.9  1.8 2.8
United States  0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5  0.7 0.9
Arithmetic Average  0.9 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.8  2.7 3.3
Source: COMTRADE and World Bank (2001).  
Note: Exports are  c.i.f. values 
 
 Table 2: Technology trade, productivity and growth 
# Code  Country  Area 
















1. ARG  Argentina  2780  34768  0.8  0.3  24738  0.5 
2. AUS Australia  7741  18072  1.0  0.5  45331  1.4 
3. AUT Austria  84  8047  2.4  1.9  45023  2.7 
4. BEL Belgium  33  10137  4.9  7.1  50154  2.1 
5. BEN Benin  113  5475 1.4  0.6  2205  0.3 
6. BFA Burkina  faso  274  9988  1.2  0.4  1804  1.6 
7. BGD  Bangladesh  144  119768 0.6  1.2  6092  1.9 
8.  BHS  Bahamas  14  .  5.4 2.5 . . 
9. BLZ Belize  23  217  3.9  2.0  18843  . 
10. BOL  Bolivia  1099  7414  1.3  0.4  6635  -0.6 
11. BRA  Brazil  8547  159346  0.9  0.4  18479  2.4 
12. BRB  Barbados  0  264  3.6  2.2  28075  3.0 
13. CAF  Central  Afr.R.  623  3288  1.5  0.4  2298  -1.5 
14. CAN  Canada  9971  29354  1.2  1.6  45021  1.1 
15. CHE  Switzerland  41  7041  3.0  3.1  44289  0.5 
16. CHL  Chile  757  14210  1.5  0.4  21990  1.8 
17. CIV  Ivory  Coast  322  13528  2.1  0.6  4888  1.1 
18. CMR Cameroon  475  13182  1.9  0.6  3765  0.1 
19. COL  Colombia  1139  38558  1.9  0.9  12070  0.9 
20. CRI  Costa  rica  51  3333  3.4  1.4  13783  0.4 
21. CYP  Cyprus  9  733  3.5  2.0  34653  4.1 
22. DNK Denmark  43  5222  2.4  3.0  44352  1.3 
23. DOM Dominican  rep.  49  7823  1.9  1.4  11847  2.1 
24. ECU  Ecuador  284  11460  2.1  1.0  12729  2.1 
25. EGY  Egypt  1001  58180  1.9  0.9  12345  2.2 
26. ESP  Spain  506  39223  1.3  1.5  40981  2.5 
27. ETH  Ethiopia  1104  56530  1.2  0.9  1217  0.0 
28. FIN  Finland  338  5108  2.1  1.6  38189  2.1 
29. FJI  Fiji  18  770  2.7  1.7  15425  1.6 
30. FRA  France  552  59326  1.4  2.9  44901  2.2 
31. GBR  U.K.  245  58612 1.5  2.7  39699  1.7 
32. GER  Germany,  West  357  81661  1.4  2.4  42529  . 
33. GHA Ghana  239  17075 2.5  0.6  2644  1.0 
34. GMB Gambia  11  1111  2.8  1.0  2311  0.4 
35. GRC  Greece  132  10454  1.7  1.6  30644  2.2 
36. GTM Guatemala  109  9976  2.6  1.3  13184  1.5 
37. GUY Guyana  215  830 4.7  1.0  7165  0.0 
38. HKG Hong  Kong  1  6156 4.5  2.5  51042  5.5 
39. HND Honduras  112  5654 3.4  1.3  6653  0.4 
40. HTI  Haiti  28  7168  1.5  1.3  3493  . 
41. HUN Hungary  93  10229 3.5  1.9  21384  . 
42. IDN  Indonesia  1905  193976  1.5  0.8  9276  4.5 
43. IND  India  3288  929358  0.5  0.7  5065  2.7 
44. IRL  Ireland  70  3601  4.8  3.4  44791  3.4 
45. ISL  Iceland  103  267  2.7  1.2  37457  1.2 
46. ISR  Israel  21  5545  2.3  1.4  42969  2.4 
47. ITA  Italy  301  57301  1.5  1.5  50605  2.8 
48. JAM  Jamaica  11  2522  4.1  2.1  7696  -0.2 
49. JOR  Jordan  89  4195  2.6  1.2  16253  1.3 
50. JPN  Japan  378  125570  0.4  0.6  36733  3.8  
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51. KEN  Kenya  580  27216  3.1  0.8  2563  1.0 
52.  KOR  Korea,  rep. 99  45093  2.6  2.8  32538 5.9 
53.  LBR  Liberia  111  .  2.4 0.7 . . 
54. LKA  Sri  lanka  66  18112  1.6  1.0  7372  2.6 
55. MAR Morocco  447  26386  1.8  1.2  10798  1.3 
56. MDG Madagascar  587  13300  1.6  0.5  1895  -0.6 
57. MEX Mexico  1958  90903  1.1  0.8  20947  0.8 
58. MLI  Mali  1240  9705  1.3  0.4  1692  -0.9 
59. MLT  Malta  0  371  5.1  3.5  34284  . 
60. MUS Mauritius  2  1122  2.2  0.9  25052  3.4 
61. MWI Malawi  118  9757  2.0  0.4  1577  1.5 
62. MYS Malaysia  330  20610  2.7  1.1  24800  4.0 
63. NER  Niger  1267  9150  0.7  0.3  1706  -1.8 
64. NIC  Nicaragua  130  4426  3.9  1.3  5848  -2.4 
65. NLD  Netherlands  41  15460  3.5  5.3  44763  1.2 
66. NOR  Norway  324  4358  1.9  1.9  48168  2.2 
67. NPL  Nepal  147  21272  0.5  0.7  2977  1.9 
68. NZL  New  zealand  271  3656  2.6  0.8  36956  0.1 
69. PAK  Pakistan  796  122375  1.7  0.8  6822  3.3 
70. PAN  Panama  76  2631  2.2  1.3  15187  1.7 
71. PER  Peru  1285  23532  1.4  0.6  10226  -0.8 
72. PHL  Philippines  300  70267  1.9  1.4  7568  0.8 
73. PNG  Papua  n.guinea  463  4301  2.1  1.3  7543  1.1 
74. POL  Poland  323  38588  1.4  2.3  16373  . 
75. PRT  Portugal  92  9917  2.7  1.6  28981  2.9 
76. PRY  Paraguay  407  4828  0.7  0.3  12243  1.4 
77.  SDN  Sudan  2506 .  1.2 0.6 . . 
78. SEN  Senegal  197  8330  2.3  0.8  3051  -0.5 
79. SGP  Singapore  1  3526  6.8  2.1  39186  4.7 
80.  SLB  Solomon  is.  29  .  2.6 1.7 . . 
81. SLV  El  salvador  21  5669  3.1  1.6  13395  0.4 
82.  SOM  Somalia  638  .  1.6 0.6 . . 
83. SWE  Sweden  450  8827  2.0  1.7  39802  1.1 
84. SYC  Seychelles  0  75  2.0  1.4  21395  3.9 
85. SYR  Syria  185  14112  1.8  1.2  15984  2.4 
86. TCD  Chad  1284  6707  0.8  0.3  2574  -0.6 
87. TGO  Togo  57  4110  2.1  0.8  2176  -0.4 
88. THA  Thailand  513  59401  2.5  1.0  12763  5.0 
89. TUN  Tunisia  164  8958  2.4  1.9  16788  2.4 
90. TUR  Turkey  775  61646  1.4  1.1  14101  2.6 
91. URY  Uruguay  177  3218  1.4  0.5  19671  1.1 
92. USA  U.S.A.  9364  263073 0.3  0.6  56065  1.5 
93. ZAF  South  africa  1221  39120  1.8  0.4  21336  0.8 
94. ZAR  Zaire  2345  43848  0.9  0.3  655  -3.8 
95. ZMB Zambia  753  8980  1.7  0.3  2436  -1.7 
Notes: Area and Population are from World Bank (2001). Actual and fitted Technology import share as explained in the text (in % of GDP). Real GDP per 
worker in 1995 at international prices (dollars) is from Penn World Table 6.1 (RGDPWOK) (updated version of PWT 5.6 by Summer and Heston (1991). 
Growth of GDP per worker is the annual average growth rate over 1965 and 1995 (in %).  
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Table 3. Bilateral Technology Imports 
  Log of Technology Imports 
 Coefficients  Interaction  terms 
Constant -24.38**  8.87** 
 (1.10)  (2.14) 
Log of distance  -1.08**  0.13 
 (0.07)  (0.21) 
Log of importer area   -0.10**  0.14 
 (0.02)  (0.09) 
Log of exporter area  -0.31**  0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.09) 
Log of importer population  -0.02  -0.40** 
 (0.03)  (0.11) 
Log of exporter population  1.71**  -0.29** 
 (0.04)  (0.11) 
Landlocked (importer)  -0.41**  0.05 
 (0.09)  (0.30) 
Landlocked (exporter)  1.20**  -0.26 
 (0.14)  (0.36) 
Longitude (importer)  0.01**   
 (0.00)   
Longitude (exporter)  0.01**   
 (0.00)   
Latitude (importer)  -0.01**   
 (0.00)   
Latitude (exporter)  0.11**   
 (0.01)   
Observations 48725   
Adjusted R-squared  0.54   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 4. First Stage Regression 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Technology imports share  0.66**    0.41** 
 (0.10)    (0.09) 
Log of Area    -0.33**  -0.19** 
   (0.06)  (0.06) 
Log of Population    -0.09  -0.17* 
   (0.08)  (0.07) 
Constant 1.29**  7.02**  5.54** 
 (0.17)  (0.56)  (0.60) 
Observations 90  90  90 
R-squared 0.34 0.48 0.57 
F-test   20.86 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5. Technology Imports and Productivity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS Full Sample 2SLS Full 
Sample 
OLS No OECD 
Sample 
2SLS No OECD 
Sample 
Technology imports share  0.24  1.45**  0.23  1.16** 
  (0.14) (0.43) (0.13) (0.42) 
Log of Area  -0.11  0.30  -0.17  0.15 
  (0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.17) 
Log of Population  0.15  0.26  0.11  0.15 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) 
Constant  8.79** 0.31  9.57** 3.44 
  (1.19) (3.15) (1.09) (2.93) 
Observations  90 90 69 69 
Hausman  test   8.93   5.31 
p-value   0.03   0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 6. Technology Imports and Productivity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS Full Sample 2SLS Full 
Sample 
OLS No OECD 
Sample 
2SLS No OECD 
Sample 
Technology imports share  0.19  1.02**  0.23  1.27** 
  (0.13) (0.35) (0.13) (0.44) 
Log of Area  -0.05  0.21  -0.16  0.17 
  (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.18) 
Log of Population  0.06  0.16  0.10  0.16 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) 
Latitude 0.02**  0.01*  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  8.85** 3.05  9.56** 2.78 
  (1.13) (2.56) (1.10) (3.02) 
Observations  90 90 69 69 
Hausman  test   6.64   6.10 
p-value   0.16   0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 7. Technology Imports: Transmission Channels 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Technology imports share  0.10** 0.35** 0.07  0.41**  0.02  0.69** 
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.26) 
Log of Area  0.04  0.12** 0.01  0.13*  -0.13*  0.09 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.11) 
Log of Population  -0.01 0.01  0.02  0.04  0.16*  0.20* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Constant -0.36  -2.09**  0.19  -2.15*  8.17**  3.59 
  (0.32) (0.78) (0.32)  (0.89)  (0.72)  (1.88) 
Observations  87 87 87  87  87  87 
Hausman test    6.14    8.41    7.35 
p-value   0.10    0.04    0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 8. Technology Imports: Growth Decomposition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Full Sample  Non-OECD Sample 
 
1965 ) (   Log GDP/W Growth GDP/W 
1965 ) (   Log GDP/W  Growth  GDP/W 
  OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS  
Technology imports 
share 
0.21 1.32**  0.02 0.32 0.19 0.82*  -0.01  1.04 
 (0.12)  (0.39)  (0.19)  (0.42)  (0.11) (0.32) (0.22) (0.61) 
Log of Area  0.09  0.46**  -0.66**  -0.56** 0.06  0.27*  -0.80** -0.44 
 (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.07) (0.13) (0.14) (0.25) 
Log of Population  -0.07  -0.01  0.70**  0.72**  -0.13 -0.13 0.80**  0.81** 
 (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.19) 
Constant 8.10**  0.55  2.95  0.90 8.71**  4.74*  3.60 -3.02 
 (1.04)  (2.79)  (1.62)  (3.05)  (0.90) (2.14) (1.80) (4.06) 
Observations  84 84 84 84 64 64 64 64 
Hausman test    9.17    0.63    4.37    3.43 
p-value   0.03    0.89    0.22    0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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